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BLD-095        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE: RASHEENA PHINISEE, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 2-09-cv-02140, 2-10-cv-01253 & 2-20-cv-05279) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
February 18, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Rasheena Phinisee has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that we 
direct the District Court to vacate its orders enforcing her settlement agreement with the 
Government and appointing a guardian ad litem for her daughter.  Phinisee also requests 
that we direct the District Court to enter a default judgment against the Government in a 
lawsuit that she recently filed, rule on her pending motion in that suit, consolidate her 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




cases, and assign her cases to a new district court judge.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the mandamus petition. 
 In 2010, Phinisee and her minor daughter, A.P., filed a medical malpractice suit in 
the District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “2010 case”).  The Government 
offered to settle the case for $1.2 million.  With Phinisee’s authorization, her counsel 
accepted the offer.  The following day, Phinisee sought to withdraw her acceptance.  The 
Government then filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  A petition for a 
minor’s compromise was also filed on behalf of A.P.  The District Court granted the 
Government’s motion and A.P.’s petition.  We affirmed, holding that the settlement 
agreement was enforceable and that the District Court did not err in concluding that the 
agreement protected A.P.’s best interests.  See A.P. ex rel. Phinisee v. United States, 556 
F. App’x 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential). 
In 2017, Phinisee filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in the District Court, alleging fraud 
on the court in connection with the settlement.  The District Court denied the motion.  In 
the course of those proceedings, the District Court appointed a guardian ad litem for A.P.  
We affirmed the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion and the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.  See A.P. ex rel. Phinisee v. United States, 736 F. App’x 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(not precedential) (noting that “it appears that an attorney should create a special needs 
trust” to protect A.P.’s interests). 
Phinisee filed a new lawsuit in state court in February 2020 (the “2020 case”), 
raising claims of medical battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud 




2020 case to the District Court, and Phinisee filed a “motion to dismiss,” raising issues 
related to the District Court’s jurisdiction.  In December 2020, the District Court granted 
the Government’s second motion for an extension of time to respond to the complaint in 
the 2020 case, ordering that the Government should file its response after a hearing was 
held on the then-pending motion to approve a special needs trust for A.P. in the 2010 suit. 
On January 26, 2021, the District Court held a hearing and entered an order 
establishing a special needs trust for A.P. in the 2010 suit.  On January 27, 2021, Phinisee 
filed her mandamus petition here.   
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases.  See 
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To obtain 
mandamus relief, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain 
the relief [she] desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, Phinisee asks us to direct the District Court to vacate its orders enforcing the 
settlement agreement and appointing a guardian ad litem in the 2010 case.  She is not 
entitled to such relief, as mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal.  See Madden v. 
Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that “a writ of mandamus may not 
issue if a petitioner can obtain relief by appeal”); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Phinisee further requests that we direct the District Court to enter a default 




consolidate her federal cases.  Again, she is not entitled to such relief.  Generally, a 
court’s management of its docket is discretionary, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 
F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), and there is no “clear and indisputable” right to have a 
district court handle a case in a certain manner, see Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 
449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).  Although we may issue a writ of mandamus when a district 
court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden, 102 
F.3d at 79, that situation is not present here.  The District Court ordered the Government 
to respond to Phinisee’s complaint in the 2020 case after the hearing on the special needs 
trust was held in the 2010 case.  Phinisee filed her mandamus petition one day after the 
hearing was held and the Government’s obligation to respond was triggered.  At this 
time, we cannot say that there has been any undue delay by the District Court, let alone a 
delay that is “tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”  Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.  
Although Phinisee’s pending “motion to dismiss” raises jurisdictional issues, the District 
Court has the power to ascertain its own jurisdiction over the 2020 case, see Arbaugh v. 
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), which it has not yet ruled on.  We remain 
confident that the District Court will rule on the matters pending before it in a timely 
fashion. 
Finally, because Phinisee has failed to raise any meritorious grounds for recusal of 
the district court and magistrate judges that have presided over her cases, mandamus 
relief is not warranted on that issue.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (recusal appropriate 




510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (adverse legal rulings alone are almost always insufficient to 
warrant recusal). 
Accordingly, at this time, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is not warranted, 
and we will deny the mandamus petition. 
 
